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Abstract
Food for education (FFE) programs, which consist of meals served in school
and in some cases take-home rations and deworming programs conditional on
school attendance, are considered a powerful tool to improve educational out-
comes, particularly in areas where school participation is initially low. Com-
pared to other programs, such as conditional cash transfers and scholarships,
school meals may provide a stronger incentive to attend school because chil-
dren must be in school in order to receive the rations, and have the potential
to improve nutritional and general health status as well. In this paper, we nd
that the Cambodia FFE, that was implemented in six Cambodian regions be-
tween 1999 and 2003, increased enrollment, school attendance and completed
education. We also ask who beneted the most, and how cost-eective such a
program is compared to other types of interventions.
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Martin Berlin, Erik Lindqvist, Olof Johansson-Stenman and all participants at IIES and Depart-
ment of Economics seminars at Stockholm University for valuable comments.
11 Introduction
There is today a wealth of programs and policies generally designed to achieve the
two Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) of universal primary gender disparities
in education. Food for Education (FFE) programs, which consist of meals served in
school and, in some cases, take-home rations and deworming programs conditional
on school attendance, are considered as a powerful means for this aim, particularly in
areas where school participation is initially low. Compared to other programs, such
as conditional cash transfers and scholarships, school meals may provide a stronger
incentive to attend school because children must go to school to receive the rations.
Moreover, the provision of food can contribute to alleviate short-term hunger during
the school day and thus improve learning and cognitive outcomes for undernourished
children. The largest international implementer of these programs in the developing
world is the World Food Programme (WFP) with 102 million beneciaries in 78
countries in 2008. This study is an evaluation of the impact of WFP's Food for
Education program in Cambodia, which was implemented in primary schools (grades
1 to 6) in six Cambodian regions between 1999 and 2003. Beyond the average impact
of the program, we also investigate who benets most. Finally, we tentatively assess
how cost-eective such a program is compared to other types of interventions.
The program was phased-in across six provinces (of 24 in total) between 1999
and 2003, allowing us to examine three dierent forms of FFE programs: i) in-
school breakfast, ii) in-school breakfast together with a take-home ration provided
to families of poor girls in grades 4 to 6, and iii) the "full package" consisting of
in-school breakfast, poor girls' take-home rations and deworming medicine to all
participating schools. The identication of the eect is based on a dierence-in-
dierence strategy exploiting the variation in the exposure to the program both
across time (before and after) and across geographical location (treated and non-
treated schools or communes).
We nd that the impact of the program on enrollment varied according to the
type of FFE program. School enrollment always increased during the rst year of
treatment, for any type of program, and this eect is largest from the full package
2program. The enrollment continued to increase at a somewhat slower pace in the fol-
lowing years, with the only exception of the 2000 treatment group, where enrollment
increased less than in the control schools in the second year of treatment. This may
point to supply constraints (the schools reach their full capacity after the enrollment
increase of the rst year). An alternative interpretation is that because of a general
growth trend also involving control schools, the treatment only aects the timing of
enrollment growth in treated schools.
Turning to the second set of results based on the individual level data, our
intention-to-treat estimates reveal that children of primary school age who live in
a commune with at least one treated school (regardless of what treatment group) on
average have 1.8 months longer education and a 10 percentage point higher proba-
bility of being in school. We nd that the probability of being in school in 2003/04 is
highest for the group of children who started treatment the year before. For the same
group of children, we do not nd any strong evidence that they also stayed in school
longer as compared to a control group: at the point when we observe them, they
did, on average, complete the same grade. On the contrary, children who started
treatment three years before (in 2000/2001) are not comparatively more likely to
be in school in 2003/04 but, at the point when we observe them, have completed
a higher grade than the control group. An intuitive explanation is that a longer
duration of treatment (at least three years) is needed to keep the children in school
for additional school years. Alternatively, it might be the case that we do not see any
eect on highest completed grade for the 2001 and 2002 treatment groups because
we observe them too soon after the treatment. Looking at the heterogeneous eects,
we nd that the program had a stronger impact on the highest grade achieved by
girls, children of low educated fathers and children from middle income families and
on the probability of being in school for children of low educated parents.
The contribution of our paper is threefold. First, we are able to make a com-
parison between three dierent types of FFE schemes, which has previously only
been done in a few studies. The evidence on the central policy question of the cost-
eectiveness of such programs is even more rare. We compare each type of FFE
program to alternative programs and nd that the full package scheme yielded the
3highest impact on enrollment per dollar spent. One plausible explanation, consistent
with previous evidence,1 is that this is due to the deworming treatment, known to be
very eective in attracting children to school and at the same time being extremely
cheap. Moreover, most studies focused on enrollment as an outcome. Given our
rich set of data, we are also able to investigate dierent measures of participation
and attendance and say something about the class size eect. This is our second
contribution.2 Third, our study also links to a broader debate about alternative
schemes aimed at reducing the cost, including the opportunity cost, of education for
poor families. Although the school fee for primary school is completely subsidized
in Cambodia, there is evidence that other cost burdens still dissuade the poorest
families from sending their children to school. Policy interventions directly targeting
the poor have been shown to be the most eective means of increasing participation
rates in developing countries.3 From a policy perspective, if the major objective is to
increase short-term enrollment, then our ndings are encouraging but if the objective
is to make children stay longer in school as well as to improve their learning, more
eorts are needed on the supply side (teachers and classrooms).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews
the FFE programs in general and previous studies. Section 3 presents some general
background and the details of the Cambodian FFE. Section 4 describes the data and
the methods used, as well as providing the descriptive statistics. We present the
quantitative results in section 5, and a cost-benet analysis in section 6. Section 7
concludes the paper.
1Miguel and Kremer (2004) nd that the cost per additional year of school participation is only
3.50 USD which is very cost-eective compared to other programs.
2Only one robust study looked into similar issues and found that school meals for preschool
children displaced teaching time and led to larger class sizes (Vermeersch et al. (2005)). However,
that study is conned to pre-school children.
3See Glewwe and Olinto (2004), Schultz et al. (2004), Attanasio et al. (2006), Todd and Wolpin
(2006), Barrera-Osorio et al. (2008) on cash incentives; Miguel and Kremer (2004) on deworming
programs.
42 FFE in general and previous studies
The objective of FFE programs is to promote households' investments in the human
capital of their children. By comparing potential future benets of education to
current costs, parents decide how much to invest in the education of each child.
There are two types of educational costs, direct costs (school fees, supplies, books,
uniforms, and travel to school) and indirect costs, for example the opportunity cost of
the child's time: instead of being in school, the child could be caring for other family
members, working on a family farm or in a family business, or working outside the
household to provide additional income. By subsidizing these schooling costs through
FFE programs, greater investment in education may be achieved.
FFE programs generally take two forms: in-school meals and take-home rations.
Compared to other demand-side incentive programs (conditional cash transfers and
scholarship programs), school meals provide a stronger incentive to attend school
because the child has to be in school in order to receive the meal. Moreover, take-
home rations work as a complementary cash transfer, compensating the household for
the foregone income that would be generated by the child if not in school. Take-home
rations are food rations given to the household conditional on a child's enrollment in
school and a minimum level of attendance. Take-home rations focus relatively more
on improving food security at the household level (Pollitt (1995)). Sen (2002) argues
that in-school meals are superior to take-home rations since the former contribute to
the nutrition of children and thus complement teaching4 as well as enhance school
attendance. They might also reduce abuse and corruption that arise in a dry ration
system due to the fungibility of the distributed rations. On the other hand, school
meals may also disrupt teaching and learning if class time is substituted for meal
time.5 The major objectives are the same, however: to increase food consumption
and improve educational outcomes and the nutritional status of the children. Many
of the FFE interventions also oer other components, related to education, nutrition,
4Because the meals are served before the school-day, the child learns more eectively, undis-
tracted by short-term hunger and hence more able to focus.
5See Vermeersch et al. (2005). Breakfast programs designed to cause as little disruption as
possible (served outside the normal teaching time) may therefore be the best policy choice.
5or health including deworming programs.
The broad range of contexts in which FFE interventions have been implemented
has led to an increasing awareness of the potential benets of FFE for dierent
outcomes including education, nutritional status, social equity and agricultural de-
velopment. Given the growing popularity of such interventions across the developing
world, and the resources targeted towards them, it is important that these hypotheses
are rigorously evaluated.
The literature on the impacts of FFE programs is very large, and almost unani-
mous in suggesting that these programs have considerable impacts on primary school
participation (Jacoby et al. (1996); Ahmed (2004); Ahmed and Del Ninno (2002)),
in particular for girls (Kazianga et al. (2009); ? ). School feeding coupled with
take-home rations seems to have a greater impact on girls' enrollment compared to
that of boys (Gelli et al. (2007); Kazianga et al. (2009)). The empirical investiga-
tions based on experimental or quasi-experimental designs providing causal evidence
is relatively scant. Vermeersch et al. (2005) conducted a randomized evaluation of
the impact of school meals on participation in Kenyan preschools, and found that
school participation was 30 percent greater in the 25 Kenyan preschools where a free
breakfast was introduced than in the 25 comparison schools. In schools where the
teacher was relatively well trained prior to the program, the meals program led to
higher test scores (0.4 of a standard deviation) on academic tests.
Despite these potential benets, there is an ongoing debate among donors and
policy-makers on the point that these programs are an expensive method for pro-
ducing the stated education and nutrition objectives and that other cost-eective
mechanisms exist. Few studies investigate the cost-eectiveness of FFE programs
and the types of school feeding programs that are most eective. There are also
very few studies that look at the dierential impacts of FFE on children by age and
gender, and compare the impact on both enrollment and school attendance. There is
a number of reasons why these two outcomes may dier. In some cases, enrollment
numbers cannot be trusted, because the schools might have incentives to boost them
in order to receive more funds. On the other hand, it is also possible for a child
to attend school without being enrolled, maybe due to incomplete school records.
6Taking both these measures into account would give policy-makers a broader picture
of the impact of the program.
Given our rich set of data, we are able to investigate dierent measures of par-
ticipation and perform a deeper analysis about the eect of the program beyond
enrollment. Moreover, the program studied in this paper takes, in the dierent
waves, three dierent forms: i) on site meals, ii) on site meals and take-home ra-
tions, and iii) the "full package", i.e. on site meals and take-home rations together
with a deworming program, which allows us to make comparisons.
3 Background
After decades of political unrest, Cambodia has in the last decade experienced po-
litical stability and high rates of sustained economic growth, at nearly 9 percent on
average. Despite the progress, Cambodia remains one of the least developed countries
in East Asia. Its GNI per capita was estimated at approximately 550 USD in 2007
and about 35 percent of the total population live below the poverty line.6 Agricul-
ture, mainly rice production and small-scale subsistence agriculture, is still the main
economic activity for a majority of households. In primary education, enrollment
is still far from being universal although the government is committed towards this
goal. Most children enroll in primary school but a large share complete only two or
three grades. Based on gures from the national school census,7 the net enrollment
rate for primary education was 89 percent in 2007, while the primary dropout rate
was 46 percent.
The recent global economic crisis threatens to have a considerable negative impact
on poverty reduction and educational outcomes. In 2008, the domestic price of rice
doubled as compared to the previous year while meat and sh prices went up by
30-60 percent, whereby many children were withdrawn from school.8 The children
6See Cambodia Demographic and Health Survey, DHS, 2005.
7Education Management Information System (EMIS) maintained by the Ministry of Education,
Youth and Sports (MoEYS).
8See "Safety nets in Cambodia. Concept note and inventory"; CARD, WFP and WB (2009).
7had to join the workforce in order to complement the reduced household incomes.
Moreover, the FFE program, running since 2000, was cut due to the soaring global
prices, increasing the cost of schooling for families.9 Past instances of similar real
income shocks in combination with increases in commodity prices have shown to
constitute a signicant risk to educational outcomes for the poor. For example, the
1997 economic crisis in Indonesia led to a doubling of the children out of school,10
while droughts in Sub-Saharan Africa have been associated with declines in both
schooling and child nutrition.11 The global food, fuel, and nancial crises have
therefore created a new role for FFE programs as a potential safety net and as a
social support measure that helps keep children in school.
3.1 The Cambodian FFE
The Cambodian FFE program started in 1999-2000 as a pilot project in the Takeo
province12 with only school feeding and was phased in during the following three
years. It was rst undertaken by the WFP and the World Bank jointly with the
Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports (MoEYS) as part of a larger WFP Relief
and Recovery Operation.13 The following year, the school feeding program was
running in Takeo, Kampot and Kampong Cham provinces. Children were provided
with one meal per day (breakfast) before school which contained the standard WFP
ration of rice, canned sh, vitamin A fortied vegetable oil, and iodized salt in order
to meet the minimal daily nutritional needs of students. The participating schools
were required to provide fresh vegetables, water and fuel for the preparation of the
WFP-supplied commodities. Parents and community members who volunteered to
prepare the hot meal received a dry ration of rice for their help. The costs for
9Source: WFP Food Security Atlas for Cambodia.
10See Frankenberg et al. (1999).
11Schady (2008).
12See a map of Cambodian provinces in the appendix.
13The broad goal of this operation is to sustain food security among chronically hungry poor,
along with the promotion of re-emerging social cohesion and support systems. Some of these
activities include food for work which is a food-based safety net program to the chronically and
transient poor, school feeding to primary schools, and rice-banks to counter the chronicle cycle of
debt in rural areas.
8providing the meals, apart from WFP's food provision, were born by the community.
In 2001-2002 the program continued in cluster schools14 where additional inputs
from the World Bank-supported Education Quality Improvement Project (EQIP)
within the MoEYS together with other primary education, health, and community
support programs were available. This expansion was undertaken in cooperation with
a local NGO, Kampuchean Action for Primary education (KAPE), and UNICEF to
include 407 schools and about 291,593 students in ve provinces, Kampot, Kampong
Cham, Kampong Speu and Prey Veng. In addition, take-home rations for families
of 16,000 girls in grades 4 to 6 were being piloted this year as an incentive to keep
these girls in school: girls of those ages are in fact more vulnerable to dropout.
The program experienced a further expansion in 2002-2003 to include an additional
province (Kampong Thom) and introduce a deworming program to all participating
schools: in collaboration with the Ministry of Health, WHO and UNICEF, WFP
provided deworming medicine to students and infection prevention training for all
teachers and students.
In addition to providing school meals during the day, WFP operations also helped
establish complementary health and sanitation activities to improve the overall edu-
cational environment. These activities include the identication of safe drinking wa-
ter and improvements in basic health, hygiene and sanitation practices for students
at school and at home. HIV/AIDS prevention education was also a fundamental
part of the educational package.
The phase-in structure of the program is summarized in Table 1.
3.1.1 The selection criteria
The selection of schools in the pilot phase was based on the Cambodia Vulnerabil-
ity Analysis and Mapping (VAM), which is a WFP technical tool used worldwide
to assess and analyze food security in order to target interventions. The analysis
14This denition refers to a particular administrative structure, in which dierent school levels
are clustered under a common administration.
9Table 1: WFP School Feeding Coverage 1999-2003
1999-2000 2000-2001 2001-2002 2002-2003
Pilot
PROVINCE Takeo Takeo Takeo Takeo
(Partners) (eqip) (eqip) (eqip) (eqip)
Kampot Kampot Kampot
(eqip) (eqip) (eqip)
Kg Cham Kg Cham Kg Cham
(kape) (kape) (kape)
Kg Speu Kg Speu
(unicef) (unicef)




SCHOOLS 64/320 201/593 403/1,078 565/1,122
PUPILS 37,500 125,000 291,593 317,053
TYPE OF FFE On-site On-site On-site On-site
Take-home Take-home
Deworming
Note: The number of treated schools and pupils reported in this table is according to
the ex-ante planning by the implementing institutions and may differ from the actual
numbers that we observe in the data.
and mapping involve taking measures of human vulnerability15 across the various
geographical areas of the country, and creating maps to visually present the infor-
mation. In general, two composite indexes are used for school feeding programs: an
index of the need for basic education (that looks at primary and lower secondary
school aged children) and an index of the need for adult education (that looks at the
adult population aged above 15). The communes with the lowest values for these
composite indexes have the highest levels of need for education and hence, should
be given the highest priority for intervention.16 However, given that the targeting
required a signicant amount of sta time and attention and that the criteria and
procedures were changed almost annually, the implementers were recommended by
their evaluation team to put less emphasis on commune targeting. These criteria
were only supposed to work as broad guidelines and not function as the sole basis of
15Vulnerability is dened as anything that increases the likelihood of a person suering disad-
vantage or deprivation of any kind.
16For methodological details of the vulnerability analysis and mapping exercise, we refer the
reader to the project technical reports, published by the RGC and WFP in 2002 and 2003.
10selection. In fact, after the pilot year, the selection of schools was based on school
clusters under the EQIP project, plus the formal submission and commitment by the
schools themselves to prepare all cooking and storage facilities.17
As discussed later, the rule of prioritizing the most vulnerable schools was not
followed. However, we found that the schools selected for treatment were systemat-
ically dierent in terms of lower repetition rates. The fact that treatment was given
to better performing schools in this sense and that the self-selection connected to the
formal submission and commitment to prepare the food might cause biases in our
estimates: a selection bias might imply that we overestimate the eect of treatment,
while mean reversion might lead us to underestimate it. We further discuss these
potential biases and our approach for dealing with them later in the paper.
4 Data and methods
4.1 Data
The data used in this paper come from multiple sources. School level data are drawn
from the Education Management Information System (EMIS) maintained by the
MoEYS.18 The main panel on which we base our analysis spans the whole length
of the program, from 1998 to 2003, covering 8,443 schools from all 24 provinces.19
The data can be perfectly merged with the information on treatment status that has
the same school identication number. We have access to an additional EMIS panel
(same source as the main one but lacking the school identication numbers) that
covers 5,250 schools between the years 1997 and 2002. Information on treatment
status is here merged based on the location name (province, district, commune and
17Source: WFP (2000), "Mid-term evaluation of PRRP Cambodia 6038.00",
WFP/EB.2/2000/3/6; WFP (2000), "Full Report of the Evaluation of CAMBODIA PRRO
6038 - Food Aid for Recovery and Rehabilitation", Rome.
18The EMIS includes information on enrollment and repetition rates broken down by grade and
gender; teaching sta age, education, experience and gender; and various school characteristics such
as number of classrooms and other facilities as well as school location, income, parents associations,
etc.
193089 schools in our six provinces of interest.
11village) and school name. The merging may not be exact due to alternative spellings
of location and school names, so we use the le for robustness checks.
Individual level data are taken from two waves of the Cambodia Socio-Economic
Survey (CSES 1999 and CSES 2004), large-scale nationally representative household
surveys collected by the National Institute of Statistics.20 Using this dataset, we can
analyze two more outcomes: the highest educational achievement, which is based on
the survey question "What is the highest level ..[NAME].. successfully completed?"
and the probability of being in school in a given year which is based on the following
survey question "Is ..[NAME].. currently in the school system?". The former is an
indicator of whether the child actually completed the full school year. Although it
measures the length or the quantity of education in a long-run perspective, it also
says something about the quality of education, because it implies that the children
did not just attend school for the sake of free food, but also completed the full school
year. Given the huge inux of enrolled children due to the FFE program, if the
schools adjust their resources (teachers and classrooms) according to the increased
number of children in school, then countervailing eects from crowded classrooms
negatively aecting teaching quality and learning are less likely to happen. Instead
of a short-term enrollment and a high pupil turnover, we would rather observe an
actual increase in the highest grade achieved for, in particular, the most vulnerable
children that would otherwise have dropped out. The latter outcome is an indicator
of enrollment that, in contrast to the school data, should be less subject to the
overreporting problem, since it is self-reported by the household. Another dierence
is that it might not only capture the enrollment but rather the attendance since a
child might have incomplete school records and be unable to enroll but still attend
school. Unfortunately, there is no information on which specic school the individuals
are attending. Based on the school data, we are able to see that there is only slightly
20CSES 1999 covers 6000 households and was carried out from January to August 1999. CSES
2004 covers 15000 households and spans from November 2003 to January 2005. Besides the socio-
economic background variables (consumption, age, sex, income, etc.), this dataset contains more
detailed information about schooling at the individual level: attendance and highest grade com-
pleted, literacy, but also reasons for not attending, as well as total costs (including school fees, text
books, other school supplies, allowances for children studying away from home, transport costs,
even gifts to teachers).
12more than one school in each commune and hence, the commune level would be the
closest to the treatment assignment level. We merge the information on treatment
status at the commune level and thus adopt an intention-to-treat approach.
The Cambodian Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) from 1998 is used to
check the pre-treatment summary statistics at the village level. The DHS is a na-
tionally representative survey with a sample size of 5000 households.
4.2 Descriptive statistics
Table 2 reports the pre-treatment summary statistics from the main school panel
and the DHS, showing dierences in enrollment, repetition rates, school and village
characteristics between treated and non-treated units in 1998. Selection bias might
be a concern, due to the VAM criteria followed in prioritizing schools for treatment,
as detailed in the previous section. However, the treated schools do not seem to be
generally worse-o before the treatment: they have slightly lower repetition rates, if
anything, and they are less likely to be dened as disadvantaged by the MoEYS, and
more likely to have a parents' association. The average class size is not signicantly
dierent. Only the student/teacher proportion is slightly worse in treated schools.
By and large, though, the data do not reveal that particularly badly performing
schools were selected into the program. The village level data from the DHS 1998
show that the treatment and control villages did not dier signicantly in terms of
educational outcomes for the adult population either.
To control for potential unobservable confounding factors, we use school xed ef-
fects. However, we cannot control for potential confounding factors that change over
time. For example, it could be the case that less often being dened as disadvantaged
and having more parents' associations gives these schools better prospects in terms
of future performance. Table 2 reveals that these dierences, though signicant, are
very small, however.
13Table 2: Pre-treatment summary statistics
Control Treatment Di. P-value Obs.
SCHOOL LEVEL
Enrollment
Grade 1 126.9 124.8 -2.168 0.625 2236
Grade 2 86.1 85.4 -0.616 0.856 2236
Grade 3 67.7 66.6 -1.160 0.700 2236
Grade 4 50.5 49.1 -1.352 0.596 2236
Grade 5 38.4 36.7 -1.743 0.420 2236
Grade 6 27.8 25.7 -2.105 0.220 2236
New intakes 72.3 71.1 -1.138 0.672 2236
Girls, grade 1 59.5 58.4 -1.117 0.601 2236
Girls, grade 2 39.4 39.3 -0.163 0.918 2236
Girls, grade 3 30.9 30.3 -0.674 0.638 2236
Girls, grade 4 22.8 22.1 -0.790 0.510 2236
Girls, grade 5 16.9 15.8 -1.095 0.280 2236
Girls, grade 6 11.6 10.1 -1.430 0.064 2236
Total 397.7 388.6 -9.144 0.567 2236
Girls, total 181.4 176.2 -5.270 0.476 2236
Girls /Boys 0.458 0.458 0 0.873 2236
Repetition rate
Grade 1 0.40 0.39 -0.011 0.262 2236
Grade 2 0.25 0.22 -0.022 0.004 2083
Grade 3 0.19 0.16 -0.013 0.093 1834
Grade 4 0.12 0.09 -0.021 0.002 1620
Grade 5 0.07 0.06 -0.009 0.154 1485
Grade 6 0.04 0.03 -0.010 0.059 1344
Total 0.23 0.22 -0.017 0.007 2236
School characterstics
Frac. disadvantaged 0.11 0.08 -0.032 0.041 2236
Frac. w parents assoiation 0.67 0.74 0.065 0.005 2389
Income p /c 26149 50780 25857 0.245 2389
Teachers /100 stud 2.23 2.13 -0.106 0.021 2236
Av. class size 54.6 55.5 1.17 0.326 2402
VILLAGE LEVEL
Frac. w primary edu. 0.49 0.48 -0.007 0.892 102
Education level, 15-24 4.7 4.0 -0.770 0.113 102
Literacy rate 0.67 0.57 -0.1 0.164 102





































































15To further alleviate the concerns about selection, we look at enrollment trends
before and after the treatment, in gure 1. The gure shows the enrollment trends
plotted over time, pooling together all treatment and control groups. For each year
after 1998, the schools treated in that year are dropped from the plot, so that all
schools are observed exclusively before receiving the treatment, except for 2002. The
series, purged of school xed eects, are clearly parallel, and only diverge in the year
of treatment.
Enrollment rates alone, as mentioned above, might not give a clear picture of
the success of a policy. First of all, increased enrollment not matched by increased
resources, like teachers orF classrooms, , might even lead to negative outcomes when
it comes to school quality and learning. Moreover, the short-term availability of food
in school might simply result in likewise short-term enrollment and a high turnover
in pupils, rather than an actual increase in their total educational achievement. This
point can be addressed by studying the household data. Figure 2 reports the average
highest completed grade for each of the birth cohorts that were of primary school age
between 1999 and 2002 in treated and non-treated communes.21 These children, aged
8 to 15 in 2004 when the survey was conducted, are compared to children aged 8 to 15
in 1999, at the time of the previous survey. The upper graph shows that the highest
grade achieved in general increased between the two survey waves. However, while
the highest grade is always lower in treated communes as compared to non-treated
communes in 1999, in 2004 this pattern is often reversed. In other words, educational
achievement increased comparatively more in treated communes. The lower graph
shows how the distribution of highest completed grade has changed between the two
points in time, revealing a drastic reduction in the number of zeroes. In other words,
the proportion of children that do not have any education at all went down and,
once more, this eect is stronger in the treated communes. These patterns are very
similar when we investigate the subsample of girls (results not shown).
21We here take an intention to treat approach. The oldest children that potentially received the
treatment were 12 (and ocially enrolled in 6th grade if they had started school at the ocial entry
age of 6) in 1999 and the youngest were 6 (1st graders) in 2002.
16Figure 2: Distribution of highest grade completed.
174.3 Specications
The identication of the eect is based on a dierence-in-dierence strategy which
allows us to control for time invariant unobservables that are correlated with program
placement and participation. For the school data, we use a xed eect specication
at the school level, looking separately at each treatment group. Given the panel
structure, we can analyze the eect on enrollment for each year of treatment g =
(2000;2001;2002) using the following specication:
Enritg = +Aftg +Trg Aftg +
g X
k=1999
kTrg  Aftg  TrGrk + i + itg (1)
where subscript i denotes the school and t the year in which enrollment is observed.
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of total enrollment, in order to
smooth a dependent variable that can otherwise take some rather extreme values.
In a given year, among all treated schools (Tr), there will be two to four sets of
schools that dier in terms of when they started receiving the treatment, i.e. which
treatment group they belong to (TrGr99, TrGr00, TrGr01 or TrGr0222). As we
want to observe the eect of treatment over time, we allow the estimate to have a
separate intercept and slope for treated schools that dier in their length of treatment
(TrAftTrGr). g k+1 hence indicates the number of years of treatment. Besides
total enrollment (in logs, to take into account school size), we also look at enrollment
by gender and grade.23A simple dierence-in-dierence specication, with treatment
group dummies instead of school xed eects, is also reported in table 4.
For the individual data, the ideal would be to use commune xed eects to
account for unobservable characteristics at the commune level, which is the closest
to the treatment assignment level. But since most of the communes only appear in
one of the surveys, making a within commune comparison over time impossible, we
22To be more precise, the TrGr99 is dened as a group of treatment units (either schools or
communes) that received treatment for the rst time during the school year 1999/2000, and so on.
23Estimations by grade are not shown. The main patterns are summarized in the result section.
Tables can be received from the authors upon request.
18use a xed eect specication at the district level. Most of the districts are, in fact,
represented in both surveys. The following is estimated:
Educidt = a + b  Aft + c  Aft  Tr + md + eidt (2)
where i, d and t index individual respondent, district and year, respectively. Since
the sample we are using contains children of dierent ages, all specications include
age dummies to account for any age-related dierences in education. Moreover, given
that the CSES 2004 survey was running over two school years (November 2003 to
January 2005), we will observe children of the same age but born in dierent cohorts,
according to when exactly they were interviewed. Therefore, we include birth year
dummies taking the value of one for children born in a given year and observed in
the CSES 2004. The outcome variables here are the highest grade achieved and
the probability of being in school, in 2004 versus 1999. We further use the same
specication with additional interaction terms for the per capita income quintile
(proxied by per capita consumption), gender and parents' educational level. A simple
dierence-in-dierence specication with treatment group dummies instead of the
district xed eects is also reported.
4.3.1 Selection bias
As mentioned earlier, according to the selection rule during the pilot phase, com-
munes with the highest education needs were prioritized for the intervention. After
the pilot phase, it was decided that schools with formal submission and commitment
to prepare cooking and storage were more likely to be given the intervention. We test
whether the rule was actually followed by running a simple regression at the school
level. The dependent variable is the treatment status indicator and a set of selection
variables are tested as determinants: a dummy for whether the school is dened as
disadvantaged, a dummy for having a parents' association, total primary enrollment,
the poverty rate in the commune of the school, the repetition rate at the primary
level. The regression is run for both 1997 and 1998, i.e. before the intervention. We
nd that (results not shown) the only factor signicantly determining the treatment
19status before the intervention is the repetition rate: a negative coecient implies
that schools with lower repetition rates were prioritized for receiving the treatment.
Hence, the rule of prioritizing the most vulnerable schools was not followed. But
the fact that treatment was given to better performing schools in terms of repetition
rates, and the self-selection connected to the formal submission and commitment to
prepare the food might cause biases in our estimates: a selection bias might imply
that we overestimate the eect of treatment, while mean reversion might lead to an
underestimation. To deal with a potential mean reversion problem, we use an addi-
tional specication, where we interact the average repetition rate for 1997 and 1998
with the after-treatment indicator variable. The results are very similar suggesting
that the bias is relatively small.
5 Results
We start with a placebo-like test: table 3 presents the eect of the treatment be-
fore the treatment, in other words, the change in enrollment between 1997 and 1998,
comparing the various treatment groups to the respective control group. For this pur-
pose, we use the additional EMIS panel for which wealso have data from 1997. We
already ruled out that schools receiving treatment were ex-ante dierent in the levels
of enrollment. If they had been ex-ante dierent in terms of their rate of increase in
enrollment, then we would expect some positive coecients in these placebo regres-
sions. But we see that the placebo treatment has no eect on any of the treatment
groups, indicating that the parallel trend assumption holds for our identication.
5.1 Eects on enrollment
Table 4 presents the results in a simple dierence-in-dierence setting for each treat-
ment year, including only schools receiving treatment for the rst time in that year.24
24If we instead look (results not shown) at all schools treated each year without considering that
schools belong to dierent treatment groups, we do no see any eect of treatment, except in 1999.
This happens because schools with dierent treatment lengths are pooled together, while the eect
is not constant over the length of treatment, the enrollment increase being smaller for the schools
20Table 3: Placebo test - eect on enrollment between 1997 and 1998
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Treatment group 1999 2000 2001 2002 All
TreatXAfter 0.0241 0.00937 -0.00234 -0.00127 -0.00127
(0.0185) (0.0122) (0.0108) (0.0100) (0.0100)
R2 0.350 0.005 0.006 0.002 0.009
Schools 2236 2236 293 1212 1871
Observations 4443 4451 578 2409 3725
Note: The dependent variable is the natural logaritm of enrollment. The coecients
compare enrollment in 1998 with 1997. The control groups include all non-treated schools
within the same provinces for each treatment group. Standard errors clustered at the
school level in parentheses.  p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01.
The table shows means of (log) enrollment by year (comparing enrollment in the year
of treatment with enrollment in the year before) and treatment status. The control
groups, one for each treatment group, include all never-treated schools within the
same provinces. We see signicant increases in enrollment with respect to the control
group and the relative increases are quite similar across treatment groups, with the
exception of the 2002 "full package" group. These group-level dierence-in-dierence
estimations are, however, very noisy, because schools can be very dierent in terms
of size, location, income, infrastructures and many other xed characteristics.
Given the panel structure of the data, we are able to observe the same schools
after each year of treatment. Table 5 reveals that the eect on enrollment is, in fact,
always positive and signicant in the rst year of treatment, even controlling for the
school xed eects, and decreases slightly over time. From column (3), we learn that
the increase in enrollment due to the FFE program after the rst year of treatment
is 5.8% with only on-site feeding (treatment group 1999 and 2000), 5.2% when the
take-home rations were also provided (treatment group 2001), and almost 19% with
the full-package including deworming (treatment group 2002).
The impact on enrollment for each single treatment group can be followed over
time by summing the coecients corresponding to the interaction terms in equation
1. For example, in the 2000 treatment group, enrollment increases by 5.82% during
the rst year, then by 5.22 - 8.34 = -3.12% in the second year, and nally by 18.8
in their second, third or fourth year of treatment.
21- 11.3 = 7.5% in the third year. Only in this particular case, the 2000 treatment
group observed in 2001/02 (its second year of treatment), do we observe a negative
eect (although it cannot be distinguished from zero), which means that enrollment
in treatment schools increases less than in control schools. However, also in the other
groups, enrollment increases clearly slow down in the following years as compared
to the rst year of treatment. One possible interpretation of the fading out of the
eect is that all eligible children that were still out of school and are sensitive to the
program (i.e., they live in households for which the program is sucient to shift the
balance of costs and benets of school towards the benet side), are already attracted
to school during the rst year of treatment. Another possibility is that the schools
reach full capacity after the increase in the rst year, and cannot enroll more children
during the following years. In fact, the average class size in the treated schools in
our data is 55 in 1999 and 70 in 2003. Similarly, there is one teacher for 57 pupils on
average in 1999 and one for 62 in 2002. Yet another interpretation could be that the
quality of learning goes down as an eect of the increase in enrollment immediately
after the introduction of free meals, which might crowd out some students over the
following years. Finally, we must acknowledge the strong general increasing trend
in enrollment, clearly visible in Figure 1, which seems to be present even in control
schools. It might well be possible that the presence of the school meal program only
has an eect in anticipating this growth in enrollment in the treated schools, but the
control schools follow suit anyway.
The analysis by grades and gender, not reported, shows that the bulk of the eect
comes from grades 4-6, and from girls. The enrollment increases are particularly large
for girls, in the absolute sense and as compared to boys, in 2001 and 2002, which we
interpret as a potential eect of the take-home rations.25 However, there are positive
eects also for boys in these years, which might suggest that the rule of exclusively
targeting poor girls with take-home rations was not strictly followed.
25Starting as a pilot in 2001 and expanding in 2002, families of girls in grades 4 to 6 were provided
with take-home rations, as girls in these grades are most vulnerable to dropout.
22Table 4: Simple dierence-in-dierences after 1 year of treatment, school level data
Non-treated Treated Dierence
Treatment group 1999
Before 5.930 6.140 0.210
(0.059) (0.072) (0.093)






Before 5.692 5.937 0.244
(0.028) (0.061) (0.068)






Before 5.732 5.780 0.048
(0.022) (0.056) (0.060)






Before 5.624 5.281 -0.343
(0.022) (0.080) (0.083)





Note: The dependent variable is the natural logaritm of enrollment.
The control groups include all non-treated schools within the same
provinces for each treatment group. Robust standard errors clustered
at the school level in parentheses. Statistic signicance is displayed
only for the dierence-in-dierence term: * p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, ***
p < 0:01. 23Table 5: Eect on enrollment, by type and length of treatment
Di-in-di Fixed eects Fixed eects
All treated schools observed in 2003/04
TreatXAfter 0.146 0.036
(0.024) (0.019)
Treated schools observed in 2000/01




R2 0.023 0.164 0.164
Schools 1302 1302 1302
Observations 2555 2555 2555
Treated schools observed in 2001/02






R2 0.039 0.425 0.427
Schools 2010 2010 2010
Observations 3957 3957 3957
Treated schools observed in 2002/03








R2 0.038 0.397 0.406
Schools 2402 2402 2402
Observations 4715 4715 4715
Note: The dependent variable is the natural logaritm of enrollment. The control groups include all non-
treated schools within the same provinces for each treatment group. Columns (2) and (3) include school
xed eects. Column (3) allows for a separate intercept and slope for the schools depending on which
treatment group they belong to. Robust standard errors clustered at the school level in parentheses. 
p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01.
245.2 Eect on highest grade and probability of being in school
We follow a similar approach for the household data and start by reporting, in table 6,
the simple dierence-in-dierence for the highest grade achieved and the probability
of being in school for all children who, based on their birth year, were supposed to
be in school during at least one treatment year. Children interviewed in 2004 in
one of the treated communes are compared to children in non-treated communes,
and then with the corresponding cohorts of children interviewed in 1999, before the
treatment started. Since there are no data prior to 1999, communes treated in 1999
are excluded from the sample. The rst treatment year in this part of the analysis
is hence 2000.
Table 6: Simple dierence-in-dierence, individual level data
Non-treated Treated Dierence
Highest grade completed in year 2004/2005
Before 2.1 1.6 -0.44
(0.057) (0.118) (0.13)




Probability of being in school in year 2004/2005
Before 0.76 0.69 -0.069
(0.011) (0.032) (0.033)




Note: The dependent variable is the highest grade completed in the rst panel and the prob-
ability of being in school in year 2004/2005 in the second panel. The control group includes
all children in the same age cohorts interviewed in non-treated communes. Robust standard
errors clustered at the commune level in parentheses. Statistic signicance is displayed only
for the dierence-in-dierence term: * p < 0:05, ** p < 0:01, *** p < 0:001.
Table 7 shows the OLS estimations including both age and birth year dummies
(columns (1) and (3)). In order to reduce the noise in the data, district xed eects
25Table 7: Average treatment eect, individual level data
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Highest grade Probability
OLS FE OLS FE
Treat -0.487 -0.130 -0.0693 -0.0686
(0.121) (0.154) (0.0341) (0.0373)
After 0.516 0.319 0.0973 0.182
(0.0652) (0.0494) (0.0142) (0.0190)
TreatXAfter 0.510 0.271 0.106 0.0995
(0.144) (0.141) (0.0339) (0.0334)
R2 0.383 0.493 0.056 0.148
Districts 168 168 168 168
Communes 852 852 852 852
Observations 22499 22499 22497 22497
Note: The dependent variable is the highest grade completed in columns 1-2 and the prob-
ability of being in school in year 2004/2005 in columns 3-4. The control group includes all
children in the same age cohorts interviewed in non-treated districts. All the regressions
include age and birth year xed eects. Column (2) and (4) include districts xed eects.
Robust standard errors clustered at the commune level in parentheses.  p < 0:1,  p < 0:05,
 p < 0:01.
are added (columns (2) and (4)) which makes the treatment estimates smaller in size.
The district xed eect estimates imply an almost two-month longer education (0.27
years more) relative to the before-treatment mean of 1.8.26 The same specication
is used for the probability of being in school.
The xed eect estimates show that this probability increases by about 10 per-
centage points more for the children in treated communes as compared to children
in non-treated communes which, relative to the mean in 2004 (69%), implies a 14%
increase due to the program. These eects are averages of all treated communes in
a given year and do not take into account the length of treatment.
In table 8, we want to investigate whether the program eect diers with the
length of treatment. Starting with the highest grade achieved, only children treated
26This gure is so low because it is an average for all children aged 7-15, including those with
zero education. The mean excludes the zeroes, i.e. the mean education achieved for those that have
been to school at some point is 2.8.
26in 2000 have signicantly higher achievements as compared to the control children
when we observe them in the 2004 survey. No eect is found for the treatment
groups 2001 and 2002 (communes receiving treatment for two years and one year,
respectively, when observed in the 2004 survey). Columns (4) to (6) reveal, though,
that these children are signicantly more likely to be in school in 2004 than the
control children. One intuitive explanation is that the duration of the program is
important: children that receive food in school for three years (started in 2000/01),
stay in school longer than they otherwise would (however, not until 2004, since their
probability in column (4) is not signicantly higher). For those that receive food for
shorter durations, the treatment does not make any dierence. In the same spirit,
we do not observe any increase in the number of those who complete the full primary
school, because three years are probably not sucient to make a dierence for this
decision.27 An alternative interpretation is that many of these children who are more
likely to be in school in 2004 are repeaters: in their case, the potential additional
years of school attendance would not show up in the completed grade. We also look
at the eect by birth year but do not nd any particular pattern in this respect.
Tables 9 and 10 present the heterogeneous eects between groups, regardless
of which treatment group they belong to. Girls and children of fathers with low
education, groups that we would expect to be disadvantaged in terms of schooling,
have completed a higher grade in 2004, while children of parents with lower education
are more likely to be in school in 2004.
27These results are not shown. Notice that the FFE went on until 2008. Hence, it is possible









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































28Table 9: Heterogeneous eects on highest grade achieved
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Girls Boys Mother's education Father's education
Low High Low High
Treat -0.0943 -0.136 -0.0224 -0.485 -0.124 0.140
(0.169) (0.168) (0.169) (0.249) (0.154) (0.238)
After 0.369 0.881 0.287 0.378 0.765 0.833
(0.0609) (0.0748) (0.0523) (0.0891) (0.0601) (0.105)
TreatXAfter 0.277 0.240 0.260 0.333 0.355 -0.0206
(0.160) (0.151) (0.159) (0.246) (0.139) (0.241)
R2 0.504 0.492 0.489 0.517 0.465 0.584
Districts 168 168 168 164 168 154
Communes 850 849 850 799 846 743
Observations 10919 11580 16017 6482 15790 6709
Note: The dependent variable is the years of education in year 2004/2005. The treatment group consists of all children
interviewed in any of the treated communes regardless of when they were treated or what type of treatment. The
control group includes all children in the same age cohorts interviewed in non-treated districts. All regressions include
district, age and birth year xed eects. Robust standard errors clustered at the commune level in parentheses. 
p < 0:1,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01.
In Table 11 we look at the last year of treatment to further investigate the eect
of take-home rations. If we separate between girls and boys in that year, we nd
that the eect in terms of a higher probability of being in school is indeed stronger
and larger for girls. Once more, this does not add to the total duration of their
education.28 This might once more suggest that the rule of targeting girls was not
strictly followed.
Although parents'educational level can be considered to be a proxy for income,
Table 12 looks in more detail at the eects of the program along the income distribu-
tion.29 The probability of being in school in 2004 is highest for the poorest quintile
30 and is decreasing with higher income, which indicates that the program is indeed
28Although not signicant, the estimates are larger for girls than for boys even in this case.
29The per capita income is here proxied by per capita consumption.
30The quintiles are computed with respect to the general population. The analysis using quintiles
computed within the sample is not reported but shows almost identical estimates.
29Table 10: Heterogeneous eects on the probability of being in school
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Girls Boys Mother's education Father's education
Low High Low High
Treat -0.0707* -0.0688 -0.0628 -0.0739 -0.0423 -0.0647
(0.0415) (0.0458) (0.0414) (0.0594) (0.0413) (0.0463)
After 0.182*** 0.107*** 0.190*** 0.173*** 0.148*** 0.0406***
(0.0256) (0.0146) (0.0221) (0.0291) (0.0161) (0.0144)
TreatXAfter 0.101** 0.0992** 0.110*** 0.0522 0.0976*** 0.0578
(0.0394) (0.0386) (0.0358) (0.0602) (0.0372) (0.0445)
R2 0.161 0.154 0.157 0.162 0.157 0.126
Districts 168 168 168 164 168 154
Communes 850 849 850 799 846 743
Observations 10919 11578 16015 6482 15788 6709
Note: The dependent variable is the probability of being in school in year 2004/2005. The treatment group consists
of all children interviewed in any of the treated communes regardless of when they were treated or what type of
treatment. The control group includes all children in the same age cohorts interviewed in non-treated districts. All
regressions include district, age and birth year xed eects. Robust standard errors clustered at the commune level
in parentheses. * p < 0:1, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01.
30Table 11: Eect by birth year and gender for treatment group 2002
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Highest grade Probability
Girls Boys Girls Boys
TreatXAfterXByr1991 0.436 0.0279 0.452 0.293
(0.492) (0.513) (0.171) (0.149)
TreatXAfterXByr1992 -0.0633 -0.127 0.371 0.314
(0.581) (0.457) (0.160) (0.172)
TreatXAfterXByr1993 -0.155 -0.140 0.369 0.215
(0.694) (0.522) (0.189) (0.170)
TreatXAfterXByr1994 0.515 0.104 0.413 0.307
(0.551) (0.535) (0.148) (0.185)
TreatXAfterXByr1995 0.629 0.0638 0.327 0.187
(0.597) (0.407) (0.191) (0.174)
TreatXAfterXByr1996 0.753 0.0971 0.491 0.140
(0.500) (0.459) (0.176) (0.228)
R2 0.459 0.439 0.181 0.181
Districts 168 168 168 168
Communes 847 846 847 846
Observations 8099 8696 8099 8695
Note: The dependent variable is the highest grade completed in columns (1) and
(2) and the probability of being in school in 2004 in columns (3) and (4). All
regressions include district, age and birth year xed eects. Robust standard
errors clustered at the commune level in parentheses.  p < 0:1,  p < 0:05,
 p < 0:01.
31a pro-poor intervention. The eect on highest grade in column (1) instead has an
inverted-U shape, displaying larger eects for the middle quintiles. The very poorest
and the richest households in the sample increase their total education less or not at
all. One interpretation is that in these households, the cost-benet balance of com-
pleting the full year is not aected by school meals. Rich children, generally having
better educational prospects, complete their education anyway with or without free
food. For the poorest households, it could be that they i) are only in school during
the free breakfast but not attending the classes (maybe need to help with family
business), ii) have incomplete school records, thus making it impossible to enroll
and ocially complete the full year, or iii) they are more sensitive to countervailing
eects from crowded classrooms.
To investigate whether the program attracted older cohorts of children, we look
at birth cohorts that, according to ocial age limits, should have been too old to be
in school during the treatment years. Table 13 presents the eect of the treatment in
terms of both highest grade and the probability of being in school for three cohorts
of older children, aged between 12-14, 12-17 and 18-20. None of these cohorts are
more likely to be in school in 2004 as a consequence of the treatment; on the other
hand, for the younger ones, a strong positive eect can be observed in terms of
highest grade. Although not (dierentially more) enrolled in 2004, when they are
16 and older, these children went to school longer than children of the same age in
the non-treated communes, which implies that they have been enrolled in primary
school during the program although they were then already aged above 12.
32Table 12: Eects by income quintiles
(1) (2)



















Note: The dependent variable is the highest grade completed in column 1 and the prob-
ability of being in school in year 2004/2005 in column 2. The control group includes
all children in the same age cohorts interviewed in non-treated districts. All regressions
include district, age and birth year xed eects. Robust standard errors clustered at the

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































A central policy question is whether FFE programs yield a higher impact per dollar
spent than alternative programs. There are, however, very few studies on the cost per
outcome for school feeding programs. The average cost of running FFE programs at
WFP in 2001 was 19 cents per child per day, including everything from the values of
all food commodities provided by WFP to the cost of transportation and monitoring,
to internationally- and locally-recruited sta.31 In 2005, the average cost was 7.9
cents per child per day, or 15.79 USD per child per year.32 In general, the take-home
rations are more expensive, around 30 USD per child per year, due to transport
costs and dierences in food bundles.33 The per child cost of deworming in 2005 was
around 22 cent per treatment against both Soil-Transmitted Helminth (STH, one
tablet of Mebendazole 500 mg costs approximately 2 cent) and Schistosomiasis (one
tablet of Praziquatel 600 mg costs 20 cents).34
Using the food allocation from the 2001/2002 school year multiplied by the 2004
average cost per metric tons for each food item, we are able to calculate a rough
measure of the total value of the Cambodia FFE program for that year.35 Table
14 shows that the average cost for on-site breakfast is around 8 USD per child per
year; take-home rations cost 37 USD per girl, so the average cost for both is 10 USD
per child.36 Assuming that it is sucient with one tablet of Praziquatel 600 mg and
one tablet of Mebendazole 500 mg to treat a child per year, the total cost for a full
package intervention that includes on-site meals, take-home rations for poor girls and
deworming is around 10.36 USD per child per year.
31Source: WFP Brief "WFP Global School Feeding Campaign - Into School, Out of Hunger",
2001.
32We are using the world average of 200 school days per year for cross-country comparisons.
33See Adelman et al. (2008).
34See "Global School Feeding Report 2006", WFP.
35See WFP, 2004, "Protracted Relief and recovery operation Cambodia 10305.0", Jan 2004, for
food costs and FASONLINE WFP for detailed resource allocation in 2001/2002.
36Bear in mind that these costs are only food costs and do not include indirect costs such as
transport costs, sta costs, etc.
35Table 14: Program costs, 2001-2002
Resource allocation Quantity 2004 value No of Cost per
2000/2001 (mt) (USD) Pupils pupil (USD)
Rice on site 3,470 697,478
take home 2,038 409,630
both 5,508 1,107,108
Vegetable oil on site 255 201,958
take home 236 186,423
both 491 388,381
Canned sh on site 663 1,453,296
take home - -
both 663 1,453,296
Salt on site 99 7,920
take home - -
both 99 7,920
Total on site 4,487 2,360,652 291,593 8.10
take home 2,274 596,053 16,000 37.25
both 6,762 2,956,705 291,593 10.14





Full package incl. deworming 10.36
Note: The average cost per metric tons of rice is 201 USD, vegetable oil is 791 USD, canned sh is
2192 USD, iodized salt is 80 USD, source: "Protracted Relief and recovery operation - Cambodia
10305.0", January 2004. The quantity of resources is based on the allocation plan for the school


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































37To assess the cost-eectiveness, in Table 15, we use the program cost with the 2004
food values divided by the number of additional children enrolled due to treatment.
The latter is computed using our xed eect estimates from Table 5. We nd that on-
site feeding is quite cost-eective, while distributing take-home rations is relatively
expensive, as expected. However, adding the deworming intervention is a way of
making the full package much more cost-eective, due to the fact that this complete
package attracts many more pupils, while the deworming medications are extremely
cheap.
In comparison, we also report in the table the cost of a conditional cash trans-
fer program, the Japan Fund for Poverty Reduction (JFPR) scholarship program in
Cambodia. This scholarship program, started in 2004, awarded poor girls who were
completing sixth grade a scholarship of 45 USD.37 The program increased the enroll-
ment and attendance of recipients at program schools by about 30 percentage points;
hence, the cost per additional child in school was 150 USD. With the exception of
the year 2001/2002, the FFE intervention was hence more cost-eective.
The Cambodia FFE was also more cost eective than the Kenya pre-school FFE
program studied in Vermeersch et al. (2005), discussed in section 2. The authors do
not explicitly report the costs of the program, so the gures in the last column of
Table 15 are our own elaborations based on data reported in their paper.
At 60 USD per child in school, the FFE still looks quite expensive as compared to
the programs overviewed in Miguel and Kremer (2004), for example. Their estimate
of the cost of a deworming intervention is hard to beat, at 3.5 USD per child in school,
i.e. if the objective is purely that of attracting more children in school. However, if
FFEs also contribute to the nutrition and general health status of children, especially
the poor and malnutrient ones, this comparison is not really fair. We did not look
at these outcomes in the present paper, but it is certainly a very important area of
inquiry for future studies.
37See Filmer and Schady (2008).
387 Conclusions
This study provides an insight into the impact of three types of school feeding pro-
grams on enrollment, educational achievements and the probability of being in school.
We show that the FFE program boosted school enrollment in the short run for all
three types of treatment: on-site feeding, take-home rations and full package includ-
ing deworming. Enrollment continued to increase at a slower pace after the rst
year, hinting at potential resource constraints. If the program attracts more chil-
dren, but the school resources remain xed, this might lead to a deterioration in the
student-teacher ratios and class size which, in turn, might impair learning. More-
over, children who were already attending school may suer negative peer eects
from lower ability children joining school. Beyond enrollment, the intervention also
increased the probability of being in school after one or two years. But in most cases,
it did not lead to higher educational achievements which might once more suggest a
negative countervailing class size eect.
This calls to mind the critique frequently raised against treatment evaluations,
namely that partial equilibrium estimates that ignore responses from general equi-
librium and political economy sources are to be taken with caution. The argument
is clearly spelled out in a recent contribution by Acemoglu (2010) for a case very
similar to the instance we are looking at. The authors show that a simple model
of the relation between cost of schooling and investments in education, and the
relative reduced-form estimations, will not be informative about counterfactuals in-
volving large-scale interventions in the presence of constraints on individual choice.
One such constraint can be given for example by school size, which we suspect to
be present in this case. In fact, we see the large rst-year impacts fade out when
the intervention is expanded over time. This consideration, together with the fact
that the intervention is a natural experiment and as such lacks the full strength of
randomization, should lead to interpret our estimates with caution.
An alternative explanation, however, is that the time horizon after the imple-
mentation of the program is too short to nd any eect on the total duration of
education. The FFE program also seems to have attracted many overaged children,
39who boosted the school enrollment gures especially in the fourth to sixth grade
(extensive margin), but for some reasons (perhaps due to their incomplete school
records) did not remain in school to increase the highest grade they complete (in-
tensive margin). It will be possible to learn more about this outcome by looking at
later data, which have recently become available.
Keeping in mind that the impact estimates must be taken with caution, and
also that we used approximative gures on costs, we tried anyway to say something
about the cost-eectiveness of this program, and make it comparable to other types of
interventions. A rough measure of the cost-eectiveness reveals that school feeding
alone is a very cost-eective intervention, in a set of comparable programs, but
adding deworming medicines, very cheap and extremely eective, makes the full-
package scheme even better. Take-home rations instead proved to be a very expensive
intervention when put in relation to the average benet. However, it seems to have
reached the intended aim of increasing schooling outcomes for girls.
The impact on nutrition and general health of this program remains to be inves-
tigated. Moreover, given the (weak) impact observed on educational outcomes, it
is possible that the program also had long-term eects on wages and employment.
These are open questions for future research.
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